(1) I want to play tennis now, but I have to teach.
(2) I don't want to play tennis now, because I have to teach. representing the conditional probability that the individual d in w assigns to the possibility that w' is the actual world (denoted w A ) , given that the value of in the actual world is i (i {0,1}).
The truth conditions for 'd wants with respect to g' in the proposed model are as follows:
Intuitively, the proposed condition is that the expected desirability of the situation in the case that is higher than the expected desirability of the situation in the case that . A typical example supporting the proposed analysis is the case of a person thinking of buying a house insurance. In the most probable case, nothing happens to the house and buying the insurance would result only in the loss of the paid premium. In the very improbable, but possible case of a house being ruined, the insurance would save this person from a financial crisis. In fact, it is reasonable for a person in this situation to want to buy insurance. A sample model for considering insurance is shown in Figure 1 . In this case the premium is 50, the chance for damage is 0.01, and the cost of damage, as perceived by d, is 100000. It is assumed that the events of buying insurance and the damage are independent. . Dashed arrows show the closest alternative world given that the truth value of is changed.
The world w 3 in the example is the -alternative to w 1 , and w 3 is less desirable than w 1 . According to the strong preference based analyses, it cannot be said that the person wants to buy insurance in this case. According to my analysis, the left part of (5) is 0.99*(-50) + 0.01*(-50) = -50, the right part is 0.99*0 + 0.01*(-100000) = -1000, and -50 > -1000. Condition (5) holds, the person does want to buy insurance, and this is the correct prediction in this case.
This analysis correctly predicts that (6) is a coherent self-report, while analyses based on strong preference classify (6) as a contradiction, since the speaker reports both preferring of in most cases and desire for , which is taken to mean preferring of in all the possible cases.
(6) I want to buy insurance. I know that most probably I'll just lose the money I'll pay for it.
My analysis is also supported by Horn's (1989, p. 326) observation that want is a Neg-Raising trigger, and that such triggers are almost exclusively weakly intolerant predicates. Want is indeed weakly intolerant according to my analysis, but strongly intolerant according to the others.
In addition to the examples discussed above, the proposed analysis explains many peculiarities in the inference patterns of want reports. My model also eliminates the need in the problematic notion of similarity between worlds, which is crucial in Heim's analysis. Furthermore, my analysis allows to demonstrate that connectedness of the predicates want and good is actually consistent with Wierzbicka's (1996, p. 51 ) examples meant to disprove it.
